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ABSTRACT 
 
             Using an error correction version of an autoregressive distributed lag model, we 
investigate the dynamics of the Korean J-Curve against her eight trading partners.  
The strict version of the J-Curve is observed with a few major Korean trading 
partners, such as the U.S. and Indonesia.  The estimation results from the Trade 
Balance Model and the Error Correction Model confirm that, after a depreciation 
of the Korean won, there has been a long-run adjustment toward the 
improvement of Korean trade balance against most trading partners.  The 
findings are consistent over different sample periods, including before and after 
the financial crisis in 1997, and with different trading partners.  After the Asian 
financial crisis, we find that the J-Curve relationship with Korean trading 
partners has become much more apparent than it was before the crisis 
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I. Introduction 
A dramatic collapse of Korean currency during the East Asian financial crisis in 
1997 presents a unique and valuable opportunity for researchers to examine the dynamics 
of the J-curve.  Korean financial markets began to crumble in the summer of 1997 after 
suffering from a series of internal and external problems, such as Kia’s financial 
problems, the downgrade of Moody’s Korean debt ratings, and the currency crisis in 
Thailand.  A significant outflow of foreign investment funds began to depreciate the 
value of the Korean won and the following stock market crash in October 1997 triggered 
an unprecedented currency crisis.   During the 6 month period between June and 
December of 1997, the Korean won went through a real depreciation of almost 46% 
against the U.S. dollar.  Comparing the seven-year average before and after the crisis, as 
shown in Table 1, the Korean won depreciated by 12-26% against the currencies of her 
major trading partners who were not affected by the Asian financial crisis. 
According to the Marshall-Lerner condition, such a significant depreciation will 
improve the trade balance of the country in the long run as long as the import and export 
demand elasticities add up to greater than one.  In the short-run, however, the trade 
balance may continue to deteriorate even after a substantial depreciation of a country’s 
currency.  Junz and Rhomberg (1973), Magee (1973), Bahmani-Oskooee (1985), and 
Meade (1988) all seem to concede that while exchange rates adjust instantaneously, there 
is a time lag for consumers and producers to adjust to the changes in relative prices.  
Moreover, since the currency depreciation of a country lowers the price of exporting 
goods and raises the price of importing goods, trade balance may actually decline 
immediately after the depreciation if foreign buyers and domestic consumers respond to 
the currency depreciation rather slowly.  The short-run deterioration followed by a 
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gradual improvement of the trade balance of a country after a significant depreciation of 
her currency is known as the J-Curve phenomenon.    
The J-Curve hypothesis, strictly speaking, calls for an initial and immediate 
deterioration followed by an improvement in a country’s trade balance following a real 
depreciation of her currency. Support for such a strict pattern, however, is quite rare in 
empirical literature (Bahmani-Oskooee and Ratha, 2004a). Indeed, such lack of support 
for the strict version of the J-Curve led Bahmani-Oskooee and Brooks (1999) to restate 
the J-Curve hypothesis as short-run deteriorations accompanied by a long-run 
improvement of the trade balance. While this weak version of the J-Curve hypothesis 
seems to be gaining some support in recent literature, we still do not have a genuine 
consensus on this matter. 
This paper adds to the existing literature by examining the J-Curve dynamics of 
Korea and her major trading partners. Both strict and weak versions of the J-Curve 
hypothesis are investigated by using a Trade Balance Model and an Error Correction 
Model.  Due to an unprecedented currency crisis in Korea in 1997 and the resulting 
changes in her industrial and trading structure, the paper also looks into the potential 
changes in the J-Curve dynamics during both the pre- and post-currency crisis period.   
Additionally, this study utilizes Korean bilateral data instead of aggregate data, since the 
estimation results from the aggregate data could suffer from an aggregation bias; i.e., a 
country’s trade balance could be deteriorating with one trading partner while at the same 
time improving with another. 1   Table 1 lists eight major trading partners of Korea; four 
developed countries, U.S., U.K., Canada and Japan, which were relatively unaffected by 
                                                 
1  The examples of studies using the U.S. bilateral data are Rose and Yellen (1989), Marwah and Klein 
(1996), Bahmani-Oskooee and Brooks (1999), and Bahmani-Oskooee and Ratha (2004b and 2004c). 
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the Asian currency crisis, while the next four countries, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and the Philippines, were hit quite severely by the currency crisis in 1997.2
The data for the period of 1980:M1 and 2005:M11 were collected from the 
Direction of Trade Statistics and International Financial Statistics of IMF.  The full 
sample is divided into two subgroups for comparison – the pre-crisis period (1980:M1-
1997.M9) and the post-crisis period (1997:M10-2005:M11), based on the timing of the 
collapse of the Korean Won against the U.S. dollar in October 1997 (Figure 1 and 2).3  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The model and methodology is 
presented in section II, followed by a discussion of empirical results in Section III.  
Section IV concludes the study. 
II. The Model and Methodology 
To identify the long-run dynamics of the J-Curve, we estimate the reduced form 
of the Trade Balance Model based on Rose and Yellen (1989): 
ln TBjt = a + b ln Yk,t + c ln Yjt + d ln REXjt + εt  …  (1) 
where TBjt is Korean trade balance with trading partner j, Yk,t is the index of Korean 
industrial production (used as a proxy for real GDP), Yjt is the index of country j’s GDP, 
and REXjt is the bilateral real exchange rate between the won and j’s currency defined 
                                                 
2 Despite its substantial depreciation, Korean currency maintained its relative strength against the 
currencies of the South-east Asia, for example, Thailand and Indonesia during the crisis. Together these 
eight countries accounted for 36% of the total Korean trade in 2005.  A few major trading partners of 
Korea, such as China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, have been excluded from the study due to the inconsistency 
of their data.   
 
3 In fact, the Korean Won already began to depreciate against the U.S. dollar since 1996 due to various 
internal problems in Korea, but the dramatic collapse occurred in October 1997 following the currency 
crisis in Thailand. 
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(e.g., U.S. dollar/Korean won) such that a decrease in REXjt represents a real 
depreciation of the won against trading partner j’s currency.  
 Trade balance is defined as the ratio of Korea’s exports to trading partner j over 
her imports from the same trading partner. The ratio is unit free, and is the nominal as 
well as real trade balance. Moreover, the model allows us to use the regressions in log 
form so the coefficient estimates are also elasticities of the corresponding variables. We 
do not impose any a priori expectations about the signs of b and c due to the mixed 
empirical evidence on these variables in other studies.4  We expect, however, the 
estimate of d to be negative and significant, implying that a real depreciation of the 
Korean won would have a favorable and significant impact on the trade balance in the 
long-run. 
Equation 1 above outlines the long-run relationship among the variables of 
interest, yet testing the J-Curve phenomenon also calls for an investigation of the short-
run dynamics of the model.  We employ an Error Correction Model proposed by Pesaran 
and Shin (1995), Pesaran et al. (2001), and recently employed in similar context by 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Ratha (2007) amongst others.5  The error-correction version of 
the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model in equation 1 is specified in equation 
2 below: 
                                                 
4 Normally, a negative sign is expected for b since imports increase as a country’s income rises. However, 
if this rise in income is due to increased production of import-substitutes, then the country would import 
less, and experience an improvement in her trade balance. 
 
5 The earlier versions include the Engle-Granger cointegration Method (1987), and the Johansen-
cointegration technique (1990). Unlike its predecessors, the ARDL-approach does not require unit-root 
testing. See Bahmani-Oskooee and Brooks (1999) for the details of this procedure in the present context.  
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The model is a standard Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR) with the lagged 
level variables in equation 1.  The lagged level variables are added as the proxy for 
lagged Error Correction Term (ECT).  Since the model estimates the short-run effect of 
the changes in the real exchange rate on the trade balance (VAR) and its long-run 
movement toward equilibrium (ECT) together, the model offers a valuable opportunity 
for us to observe the short-run and long-run dynamics of the J-Curve at the same time.6
The VAR estimation process employs the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for 
the optimal lag selection, followed by an F-test with the null hypothesis of  “non-
existence of cointegration (i.e., H0: δ1=δ2=δ3=δ4)”.  Since the F-test results depend on 
the number of lags imposed on each first differenced variable, we report the value of the 
F-statistic for lag-structure chosen by AIC only.  From the selected model, the 
coefficients of the real exchange rate from equation 2 are examined in order to find 
evidence of the short-run J-Curve phenomenon. We also look into the coefficient of the 
error correction terms in order to identify the presence of the long-run relationship 
(cointegration) among the variables in the Trade Balance Model.7   
 
III. Empirical Results and Findings 
                                                 
6 The theoretical justification and statistical implication of this model is fully addressed in Bahmani-
Oskooee and Ratha (2007). 
 
7 See, for example, Kremers et al. (1992). The error-correction terms have the expected signs in all cases 
and are significant in most of the cases. Thus, we accept that there is a long-run relation amongst the 
variables of the bilateral trade balance model.  
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The estimation of the short-run J-Curve dynamics is summarized in Tables 2a, 2b 
and 2c.  In the full sample, the strict version of the J-Curve was not observed in Korean 
bilateral trade with any trading partners.  Japan and the Philippines show promising signs 
for the short-term deterioration and gradual improvement of the Korean trade balance 
after the depreciation of the Korean won, but the coefficients were mostly insignificant. 
The same results were observed with the pre-crisis sample.  In the post-crisis sample, 
however, the J-Curve pattern became more apparent with the United States, Japan, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines.  The strict version of the J-Curve is observed with the 
United States and Indonesia, which indicates a five to six month deterioration of the 
Korean trade balance after the depreciation of the Korean won, followed by a gradual 
recovery of the trade balance.  A similar pattern is also shown with Japan and the 
Philippines, while the coefficients of the lags were not significant.  The results suggest, in 
case of Korea, the strict version of the J-Curve began to appear with her trading partners 
after the currency crisis in 1997.  The reasons for the sudden appearance of the Korean J-
Curve with her trading partners after the currency crisis are beyond the scope of this 
paper; yet we might be able to gain insight from the fact that Korea and other Asian 
developing countries had undergone dramatic restructuring of their industries and 
improved their economic efficiencies significantly under the guidance of the IMF and the 
World Bank since the currency crisis in 1997.8   
Table 3 presents the summary of the F-test with the null hypothesis of  “non-
existence of cointegration” in equation 2.  With the 90% critical value of 3.57, the 
                                                 
8 Since the currency crisis in 1997, Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand have undergone dramatic restructuring 
of industries, financial infrastructure, and foreign exchange management (guided by the IMF and the World 
Bank) and expect to improve their economic efficiency significantly. Mako (2001) fully discusses the 
restructuring process of these Asian countries.  
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evidence of cointegration among the four variables in the model were found in all cases.  
The long-run dynamics of the J-Curve in Korea is also confirmed in the Tables 3a, 3b, 
and 3c, in which the long-run coefficients of the real exchange rate are presented.  In 
Table 3a with full sample, the long-run coefficients of the J-Curve is observed only with 
four developed countries - United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan.  Table 3b 
shows a similar pattern with Thailand added, and UK dropped out. In Table 3c, Indonesia 
was added and Thailand removed.  It is worth noting, in full sample, the long-run 
coefficients of the real bilateral exchange rate produced the expected sign (i.e., negative) 
with all trading partners, except Malaysia, consistently in all samples.9  It implies that the 
real depreciation of the Korean won would have a favorable impact on her trade balance 
in the long run. 10
Additionally, the empirical results indicate there was a domestic income effect on 
the Korean trade balance, meaning Korean imports (relative to exports) increase as her 
income increases, resulting in a decline in the Korean trade balance.  The income effect is 
observed with Japan and Thailand in full sample; U.K, Canada, Japan, and Thailand in 
the pre-crisis sample, and U.K., Japan, Malaysia, and Thailand in the post-crisis sample.  
The positive coefficients observed for the domestic income variable – for example, U.K., 
Canada, and Indonesia in the post-crisis sample – may be explained by the import 
                                                 
9 Our results for the U.S.-Korea bilateral trade are consistent with those of Bahmani-Oskooee and Ratha 
(2004c). Also, for Malaysia, as in here, the latter study also found that the coefficient of real exchange rate 
was insignificant. This may have been because of Malaysian trade barriers. 
  
10 The stability tests based on CUSUM and CUSUMSQ criteria are reported in Table 5.  They indicate that 
the coefficient estimates are found to be stable with most Korean trading partners.  
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substitution.11   Table 3c shows a similar income substitution of Korean trading partners, 
the Philippines, for example, after the currency crisis. 
 
 
IV. Summary and Conclusions 
Using an Error Correction version of the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) 
model, we investigate the dynamics of the Korean J-Curve against her eight trading 
partners. The strict version of the J-Curve is observed with a few major Korean trading 
partners, such as the U.S. and Indonesia.  The estimation of the conventional Trade 
Balance Model and the examination of error correction terms in the VAR model indicate 
that, after a depreciation of the Korean won, the long-run adjustment toward the 
improvement of the Korean trade balance is expected against most trading partners.  The 
findings are consistent over different sample periods, including before and after the 
financial crisis in 1997, and with different trading partners.  After the Asian financial 
crisis, we also find that the J-Curve relationship with Korean trading partners has become 
much more apparent than before the crisis.  Other than the real exchange rate and 
domestic and foreign incomes, we recognize that trade restrictions such as tariffs and 
quotas, exchange rate regimes, and various other institutional and infrastructural factors 
can all impact a country’s trade balance. While it is not practicable to account for all 
these factors, we find the variables of our model have become more significant in cases 
after the crisis than before.  Based on CUSUM and CUSUMSQ criteria, the coefficient 
estimates are found to be quite stable in most cases, and in all cases is the post crisis era. 
                                                 
11 Normally, imports increase as a country’s income rises, but, if this rise in income is due to increased 
production of import-substitutes, then the country would import less and may experience an improvement 
of her trade balance. 
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Since the study used bilateral trade data, instead of aggregate data, our estimation results 
are relatively free from potential aggregation bias.   
 
 
Appendix 
Data, Definition, and Sources 
 
Sources 
Monthly data are used to carry out the empirical work. The sample comprises of 
Korea’s trade with her eight trading partners, viz. United States (1980:M1-2005:M9), 
United Kingdom (1980:M1-2005:M9), Canada (1980:M1-2005:M9), Japan (1980:M1-
2005:M9), Indonesia (1980M1-2005M3), Malaysia (1980:M1-2005:M9), Philippines 
(1981M1-2005M6), Thailand (1987M1-2005M9).  The data for exchange rate, CPI and 
national income are collected from the Direction of Trade Statistics of IMF (CD-ROM) 
in various issues. The trade balance data are from the International Financial Statistics of 
IMF (CD-ROM). The industrial production index for Thailand was collected from the 
Bank of Thailand website.  
 
Variables 
TBj = US trade balance with her trading partner j is defined as the ratio of Korea’s 
exports to country j over her imports from j (collected from source a). Thus, an increase 
in this ratio implies an improvement of the trade balance. 
Yj = Index of real GDP of country j. Industrial production index (collected from 
source b) is used as a proxy since monthly data on GDP are not available in most of the 
cases. The only exception is Thailand for which the index was for industries in the export 
sector, obtained from the Bank of Thailand website.  
Yk = Index of real GDP of the Korea.  Again, the industrial production index is 
used as a proxy. 
REXj = Bilateral real exchange rate between the won and trading partner j’s 
currency. It is defined as (Pk*NEXj)/P j , where Pk is the Korean CPI, P j is country j’s 
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CPI, and NEXj is the nominal bilateral exchange rate defined as the number of j’s 
currency per unit of the won. Thus a decline in REXj is a reflection of the real 
depreciation of the Korean won relative to j’s currency. 
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Table 1: The Changes in Korean Real Exchange Rate and Trade Balances 
 
 
 Pre-Crisis Period (1990.01-1997.09) and Post-Crisis (1997.10-2004.12) 
Trading 
Partners 
Real 
Exchange 
Rate*   
Trade 
Balance   
 Pre Post Change Pre Post Change 
US 0.00114005 0.00083917 -26% 0.91885855 1.32356967 44% 
UK 0.0007086 0.00052554 -26% 1.15462216 1.86229993 61% 
Canada 0.00138933 0.00122136 -12% 0.82230486 1.17979634 43% 
Japan 0.11602373 0.10100311 -13% 0.56967761 0.58727025 3% 
       
Indonesia 5.39583087 6.99054161 30% 0.79822963 0.65539649 -18% 
Malaysia 0.00311711 0.003224 3% 0.90595686 0.98725301 9% 
Philippines 0.03930166 0.03806326 -3% 2.77007961 2.16638054 -22% 
Thailand 0.032862 0.035039 6% 2.648143 1.515063 -42% 
 
* Other Currency/Korean Won 
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Table 2a: Coefficient Estimates of Exchange Rate and Error Correction Term  
Based on AIC: Full Sample: 1980:M1 – 2005:11 
 
Trading 
Partner DLREX 
 
DLREX1 
 
DLREX2 
 
DLREX3 
 
DLREX4 
 
DLREX5 
 
DLREX6 
 
DLREX7 
 
EC(-1) 
United States -0.10 (0.40)        
-0.17 
(5.17) 
United 
Kingdom 
-0.39 
(2.64)        
-0.29 
(4.43) 
Japan 0.12 (0.84) 
-0.20 
(1.30) 
0.11 
(0.76) 
0.26 
(1.76) 
0.23 
(1.49)    
-0.14 
(2.74) 
Canada -0.53 (2.92)        
-0.20 
(3.54) 
Indonesia -0.13 (0.92)        
-0.34 
(4.03) 
Malaysia 0.17 (0.83)        
-0.10 
(1.63) 
Philippines 0.15 (0.31) 
-0.44 
(0.91) 
-1.48 
(3.10) 
-0.75 
(1.57) 
0.17 
(0.36) 
0.67 
(1.41) 
1.12 
(2.38) 
-0.72 
(1.50) 
-0.26 
(3.63) 
Thailand 0.44 (1.28)        
-0.50 
(6.45) 
 
Note: Figures in parentheses represent absolute values of t-statistic. 
 
 
Table 2b: Coefficient Estimates of Exchange Rate and Error Correction Term 
Based on AIC: Pre-Crisis (1980:M1-1997:M9) 
 
 
Trading 
Partner 
DLREX DLREX1 DLREX2 DLREX3 DLREX4 DLREX5 DLREX6 EC(-1) 
United States -0.61 
(0.59) 
2.01 
(1.94) 
     -0.23 
(4.66) 
United 
Kingdom 
-0.10 
(0.40) 
      -0.40 
(4.98) 
Canada -1.98 
(5.50) 
      -0.74 
(6.18) 
Japan 0.32 
(1.34) 
0.38 
(1.50) 
0.51 
(2.04) 
0.20 
(0.80) 
0.52 
(2.07) 
0.41 
(1.64) 
0.60 
(2.43) 
-0.28 
(3.04) 
Indonesia 1.66 
(1.73) 
      -0.22 
(2.09) 
Malaysia 0.19 
(0.70) 
      -0.13 
(1.63) 
Philippines -0.18 
(0.83) 
      -0.79 
(7.85) 
Thailand 1.24 
(0.59) 
-1.23 
(0.61) 
1.11 
(0.57) 
6.46 
(3.30) 
   -0.66 
(7.73) 
 
Note: Figures in parentheses represent absolute values of t-statistic. 
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Table 2c: Coefficient Estimates of Exchange Rate and Error Correction Term Based on AIC: Post-Crisis (1997:10-2005:11) 
 
Trading 
Partner 
DLREX DLREX1 DLREX2 DLREX3 DLREX4 DLREX5 DLREX6 DLREX7 DLREX8 DLREX9 DLREX10 DLREX11 EC(-1) 
United 
States 
0.19 
(0.84) 
0.67 
(2.09) 
0.39 
(1.44) 
0.71 
(2.81) 
0.59 
(2.40) 
0.08 
(0.33) 
-0.12 
(0.54) 
0.06 
(0.29) 
-0.49 
(2.38) 
-1.02 
(4.76)   
-1.54 
(6.57)
United 
Kingdom 
-0.27 
(1.34)            
-0.45 
(5.30)
Canada -0.13 (0.31) 
-0.29 
(0.67) 
0.84 
(1.95) 
0.43 
(1.01) 
0.49 
(1.18) 
-0.09 
(0.22) 
0.83 
(1.98) 
-0.47 
(1.12) 
-1.00 
(2.42)    
-1.00 
(NA) 
Japan 0.24 (1.62) 
-0.11 
(0.60) 
0.10 
(0.51) 
0.35 
(1.97) 
        -0.42 (3.77)
Indonesia 0.51 (5.57) 
0.44 
(3.32) 
0.54 
(4.35) 
0.28 
(2.25) 
0.06 
(0.55) 
-0.29 
(2.42) 
-0.10 
(0.80) 
-0.19 
(1.71) 
-0.26 
(2.25) 
-0.37 
(3.20) 
-0.13 
(1.32)  
-1.16 
(5.37)
Malaysia 0.27 (0.70) 
0.65 
(1.00) 
0.93 
(1.40) 
1.15 
(1.72) 
1.12 
(1.76) 
0.33 
(0.54) 
1.26 
(2.14) 
1.21 
(2.03) 
2.30 
(4.11) 
0.65 
(1.12) 
0.45 
(0.83) 
1.41 
(3.08) 
-0.10 
(1.63)
Philippines 0.52 (1.09) 
-2.21 
(3.31) 
-0.90 
(1.30) 
-0.98 
(1.55) 
1.05 
(1.55) 
-0.98 
(1.44) 
-1.49 
(2.37) 
0.89 
(1.35) 
0.33 
(0.61) 
-0.74 
(1.61) 
  -0.54 (3.09)
Thailand 0.61 (2.10)            
-0.58 
(6.45)
 
Note: Figures in parentheses represent absolute values of t-statistic. 
 
Table 3: The Result of F-Test for Cointegration Among the Variables of Bilateral 
Trade Balance between US vis-à-vis her Trading Partners 
 
 
F-statistic for Lag-Structures (Selected by AIC) Imposed on the 
First-Differenced Variables: TBj, YK , Yj , and REXj
 
Trading Partner 
 
Whole Period Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
United States F(12, 0, 8,1)=11.22 F(12, 5, 4, 2)=10.18 F(7, 1, 6, 10)=7.93 
United Kingdom F(7, 2, 1, 0)=13.20 F(3, 2, 0, 0)=13.52 F(1, 11, 0, 0)=5.69 
Canada F(8, 0, 0, 0)=18.43 F(4, 0, 0, 1)=20.63 F(0, 0, 2, 9)=10.95 
Japan F(12, 12, 8, 6)=7.66 F(12, 12, 5, 7)=5.74 F(12, 10, 2, 4)=11.14 
Indonesia F(11, 0, 3, 0)=20.71 F(5, 0, 2, 1)=25.36 F(12, 11, 12, 11)=5.26 
Malaysia F(12, 0, 0, 0)=13.63 F(2, 1,3,1)=4.89 F(12, 3,7,11)=12.51 
Philippines F(12, 1, 0, 8)=12.59 F(2, 12, 0, 0)=12.15 F(9, 12, 7, 10)=5.03 
Thailand F(2, 1, 10, 10)=6.44 F(1, 4, 7,10)=5.32 F(1, 1, 0, 0)=13.42 
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Table 4a: Estimated Long Run Coefficients of the Bilateral Trade Balance Model 
Based on Akaike Information Criterion 
 
Trading Partner 
( country j) Constant YK Yj REXj
United States -17.60 (4.83) 
0.18 
(0.55) 
-1.51 
(1.60) 
-3.41 
(6.55) 
United 
Kingdom 
-6.43 
(1.08) 
-0.25 
(1.01) 
-0.48 
(0.37) 
-1.36 
(2.85) 
Canada -26.06 (4.26) 
-0.78 
(1.81) 
2.67 
(1.91) 
-2.64 
(3.58) 
Japan -1.93 (0.74) 
-0.57 
(3.03) 
0.10 
(0.12) 
-1.60 
(2.60) 
Indonesia -8.96 (2.77) 
0.43 
(1.84) 
1.61 
(2.34) 
-0.38 
(0.94) 
Malaysia 9.08 (0.50) 
-1.66 
(0.76) 
2.02 
(0.89) 
1.86 
(0.70) 
Philippines -1.49 (0.54) 
-0.37 
(1.86) 
-0.60 
(3.25) 
-0.29 
(0.46) 
Thailand 1.26 (0.83) 
-2.22 
(8.04) 
1.83 
(6.53) 
-0.20 
(0.51) 
 
Note: Figures in parentheses represent absolute values of t-statistic. 
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Table 4b: Estimated Long Run Coefficients of the Bilateral Trade Balance Model 
Based on Akaike Information Criterion, Pre-Crisis 
 
Trading Partner 
( country j) Constant YK Yj REXj
United States -7.02 (1.39) 
0.67 
(2.16) 
-3.90 
(3.22) 
-3.05 
(6.26) 
United 
Kingdom 
-5.39 
(0.87) 
-0.81 
(3.15) 
1.56 
(1.40) 
-0.25 
(0.40) 
Canada -23.92 (9.82) 
-0.55 
(4.55) 
1.96 
(4.20) 
-2.64 
(10.40) 
Japan -5.95 (2.90) 
-0.85 
(4.00) 
1.49 
(2.58) 
-0.98 
(2.73) 
Indonesia -4.44 (0.45) 
0.81 
(0.92) 
0.31 
(0.13) 
-0.33 
(0.30) 
Malaysia 2.80 (0.18) 
0.88 
(0.46) 
0.57 
(0.29) 
1.44 
(0.62) 
Philippines -2.67 (2.36) 
0.54 
(1.11) 
0.16 
(0.48) 
-0.23 
(0.84) 
Thailand -3.89 (1.67) 
-3.50 
(5.29) 
2.62 
(5.66) 
-2.80 
(0.84) 
 
Note: Figures in parentheses represent absolute values of t-statistic. 
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Table 4c: Estimated Long Run Coefficients of the Bilateral Trade Balance Model 
Based on Akaike Information Criterion, Post-Crisis 
 
Trading Partner 
( country j) Constant YK Yj REXj
United States -14.58 (11.02) 
0.62 
(9.96) 
1.15 
(4.14) 
-0.95 
(10.13) 
United 
Kingdom 
-1.78 
(0.27) 
-0.65 
(3.07) 
0.17 
(0.15) 
-0.59 
(1.36) 
Canada -17.58 (4.51) 
0.69 
(2.42) 
2.11 
(2.18) 
-0.73 
(2.02) 
Japan -13.91 (3.33) 
-0.75 
(4.27) 
2.99 
(3.09) 
-1.38 
(5.80) 
Indonesia -8.45 (6.45) 
0.53 
(5.02) 
1.53 
(7.41) 
-0.68 
(7.92) 
Malaysia -4.30 (0.52) 
-3.21 
(5.53) 
3.25 
(3.35) 
-0.71 
(0.69) 
Philippines -1.49 (0.54) 
-0.37 
(1.86) 
-0.60 
(3.25) 
-0.29 
(0.46) 
Thailand 2.76 (1.12) 
-1.30 
(3.91) 
0.82 
(2.38) 
0.09 
(0.19) 
 
Note: Figures in parentheses represent absolute values of t-statistic. 
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Table 5: Stability Test 
 
Whole Sample Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Trading 
Partner CUSUM CUSUMSQ CUSUM CUSUMSQ CUSUM CUSUMSQ
United States Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable 
United 
Kingdom Stable Unstable Unstable Unstable Stable Stable 
Canada Unstable Unstable Stable Stable Stable Stable 
Japan Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable 
Indonesia Unstable Unstable Unstable Unstable Stable Stable 
Malaysia Stable Unstable Unstable Unstable Stable Stable 
Philippines Stable Unstable Stable Unstable Stable Stable 
Thailand Stable Unstable Stable Stable Stable Stable 
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Figure 1 
 
Korean Real Exchange Rate and Trade Balances with Industrialized Countries 
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Figure 2 
 
Korean Real Exchange Rate and Trade Balances with Other Asian Countries 
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